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We model EU countries’ bank ratings using financial variables and allowing for intercept and 
slope heterogeneity. Our aim is to assess whether “old” and “new” EU countries are rated 
differently and to determine whether “new” ones are assigned lower ratings, ceteris paribus, 
than “old” ones. We find that country-specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous 
intercepts) are a crucial determinant of ratings. Whilst “new” EU countries typically have 
lower ratings than “old” ones, after controlling for financial variables we also discover that all 
countries have significantly different intercepts, confirming our prior belief. This intercept 
heterogeneity suggests that each country’s rating is assigned uniquely, after controlling for 
differences in financial factors, which may reflect differences in country risk and the legal and 
regulatory framework that banks face (such as foreclosure laws). In addition, we find that 
ratings may respond differently to the liquidity and operating expenses to operating income 
variables across countries. Typically ratings are more responsive to the former and less 
sensitive to the latter for “new” EU countries compared with “old” EU countries. 
JEL-Code: C25, C51, C52, G21. 
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Ratings of banks and companies conducted by External Credit Assessment Institutions 
(ECAIs) may be seen as instruments that provide investors with prima facie information 
about the financial position of the subject in question and on the price of credit risk.  
Ratings are ordinal measures that should not only reflect the current financial position of 
sovereign nations, firms, banks, etc. but also provide information about their future financial 
positions. The objective of our paper is to analyse the determinants of individual bank ratings 
conducted by Fitch Ratings (FR) and to investigate whether the country of origin matters for 
individual ratings. For this purpose, we first consider whether (and which of) the key 
financial variables of banks reflect individual ratings (that is, according to FR, a key 
component for long- and short-term rating). Second, we examine whether bank ratings are 
systematically determined by the country origin of commercial banks. Our first hypothesis is 
that FR might assign higher ratings to commercial banks from “old” EU countries that have 
the same financial position as those from “new” EU countries. This could reflect differences 
in country risk (given that bank ratings cannot exceed sovereign ratings) or differences in 
legal and regulatory factors (including their enforcement), such as foreclosure laws. Another 
hypothesis is that FR might set ratings differently for “old” and “new” EU countries in terms 
of response to financial factors. That is, the coefficients on financial variables in a regression 
explaining ratings may be different for “old” and “new” EU countries. 
In other words, we test if commercial banks from “new” EU countries are assigned 
ratings on the basis of their financial ratios in the same way as “old” EU countries or if other 
factors are considered. To this end, we incorporate “new” EU and country-specific indicator 
variables to capture heterogeneous variations in ratings under the rationale that a bank’s 
rating is related to the country in which it is based. For country-specific indicators we 
construct index-of-indicator variables that are in the spirit of the method applied in Hendry 
(2001) and Hendry and Santos (2005), although we extend it to allow heterogeneous country 
slopes. Caporale et al. (2009) applied a similar methodological approach, within the context 
of modelling bank ratings, by allowing country-specific intercepts. Our extension to permit 
country-specific slopes is a further contribution to current research in this field. We also 
assess the predictive power of our model to classify the individual ratings of the commercial 
banks in question. 
The ability to predict the financial soundness of banks, corporations and sovereign 
countries has been of central importance for analysts, regulators and policy makers. A large 2 
 
number of studies have employed financial ratios to predict failures of individual firms 
(banks), for example, Altman et al. (1977) and Ohlson (1980). Models that predict bank 
failures using so-called Early Warning Systems (EWS) have appeared in a number of studies, 
including Mayer and Pifer (1970) and Kolari et al. (2002).  Within this context, the financial 
variables of commercial banks have been utilised in several ways.   
Yet the ability of ECAIs to assign ratings correctly has been extensively questioned 
(Altman and Saunders, 1998, Levich et al., 2002, Altman and Rijken, 2004, Amato and 
Furfine, 2004, Portes, 2008). One of the most frequent arguments about the prediction 
abilities of rating agencies (RAs) is that they could provide misleading information since the 
analysis is backward- rather than forward-looking. In addition, the low transparency of 
ratings assignments contributes to the concern over the accuracy of ratings. Further, ECAIs 
do not have, and cannot have, superior information to market participants about uncertainty 
and the degree of insolvency (illiquidity) of companies. By modelling ratings we seek to 
identify their determinants and, using measures of fit, gauge how transparent ratings 
assignments are. In particular, we assess the extent to which ratings are determined by a 
bank’s financial position and, using indicator variables, ascertain the extent to which rating 
assignments reflect differences in a bank’s country of origin.  
There are numerous studies that predict bond ratings such as Kamstra et al. (2001),  
who utilise ordered-logit regression. Other recent studies (Kim, 2005; Huang et al., 2004 and 
Lee, 2007) show that artificial intelligence methods do not provide superior predictions of 
bond ratings compared with standard ordered-choice methods.
4 Hence, using ordered 
logit/probit regressions is a valid way of addressing the main challenge in modelling ratings, 
which is to increase the probability of correct classifications. However, we are not aware of 
any previous studies that seek to model and predict individual bank ratings allowing for 
heterogeneous country effects (in both intercept and slope), which is the aim of this paper.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 






                                                 
4 There is also extensive research on credit risk ratings migration, see, for example, Feng et al. (2008), and 
Stefanescu et al. (2009). 3 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
We model the individual ratings of EU banks as produced by Fitch Ratings (FR). 
These ratings are divided into six main categories (A, B, C, D, E, F) which, with four 
intermediate subdivisions (A/B, B/C, C/D, D/E), give ten categories of bank performance. 
We use 1168 ratings observations for 303 different European banks, denoted  i Y , between 
1996 and 2008.
5  i Y  is ordinal and has ten categories that are assigned integer values, 0 to 9: 
lower values indicate a lower rating. The ten rating categories are: F (0), E (1), D/E (2), D 
(3), C/D (4), C (5), B/C (6), B (7), A/B (8), A (9).  
We apply ordered-choice estimation techniques to model this ordinal dependent 
variable because, as is well known, they are the appropriate method to use in this case. The 






ki k i u X Y + =∑
=1
* β   (1) 
 
where  ki X  is the k
th explanatory variable for the i
th bank,  i u  is a stochastic error term, and 
*
i Y  
is the unobserved dependent variable that is related to the observed dependent variable,  i Y , 
(assuming ten categories) as follows:  
 
                                                 
5 On average there are 3.85 (approximately 4) different time-series observations for each bank (some ratings in 
our sample change while others are simply confirmed). This suggests that the sample may not be independent: 
there may be bank specific factors that affect each bank in all time periods. To the extent that such factors are 
omitted from our model they will enter the model’s error term. If such factors are uncorrelated with the variables 
included in the model the strict exogeneity assumption will not be violated and the estimator will not become 
inconsistent from this source. However, if these omitted factors are correlated with the model’s covariates this 
will induce inconsistency in the estimator. To guard against this we try to minimise the likelihood of there being 
omitted variables by incorporating the financial covariates previously considered in the literature and by adding 
a country index to account for country-specific factors that affect a bank. However, we do not incorporate 
individual intercepts (essentially fixed effects) for each bank because this can cause inconsistency in the 
estimator when the number of time-series observations per bank is small, due to the incidental parameters 
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where  1 λ ,  2 λ ,…,  9 λ  are unknown limit points to be estimated with the coefficients (the 
k β s). We are primarily interested in the general direction of correlation between the 
dependent and independent variables. Therefore, we use the sign of  k β  to provide guidance 
on whether the estimated signs of the coefficients are consistent with our a priori 
expectations. This is instead of looking at the marginal effects which indicate the direction of 
change of the dependent variable (for each value of the dependent variable) in response to a 
change in  ki X . For ordered-choice models these marginal effects are difficult to interpret.  
  The probit form of this model assumes that the cumulative distribution function 
employed is based upon the standard normal, while the logit form assumes a logistic 
distribution. Greene (2008) suggests that probit and logit models yield results that are very 
similar in practice and so we focus on one form, namely the probit form.  
The first explanatory variable that we consider is the year in which the rating was 
made [ i Date ]. This is 3 in 1996, 4 in 1997, 5 in 1998 and so on.
6 The second set of 
covariates considered is the first lagged values of the following seven financial variables: the 
ratio of equity to total assets [denoted  i Equity ], the ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
[ i Liquidity ], the natural logarithm of total assets [ ( )i Assets ln ], the net interest margin 
[] i NIM , the ratio of operating expenses to total operating income [ i OI OE_ ], other operating 
income to total assets, [] i OOIA  and the return on assets [ i ROA ].
7 Current values of financial 
variables are not used as they may contain information not known when the rating was 
                                                 
6 Originally we had data from 1994 where 1994 took the value of 1. However, data prior to 1996 was lost due to 
missing observations on some variables. 
7 Some other variables were considered but were omitted from the analysis due to multicollinearity.   5 
 
made.
8 A further benefit of using lagged financial variables is that it ensures that they are 
exogenous and no endogeneity bias will affect the estimates.
9 The choice of variables is 
guided by the past literature. 
  A third set of variables employed are country indicator (or dummy) variables. Two broad 
types of indicators are considered. First, we construct a shift dummy variable, 
New
i D , that is 
defined to take the value of unity for the 12 “new” EU countries and is zero for the 15 “old” 
EU countries.
10 This dummy variable, multiplied by the p
th financial variable,  pi Z , yields the 




pi D Z Z × = , where, 
1,2,...,7 = p .
11 Second, we develop index-of-indicator variables that allow each country to 
have different intercept and slope coefficients. However, an ordered-choice model 
incorporating 27 dummy variables for each covariate cannot be estimated; hence, we employ 
a method that is in the spirit of Hendry (2001) and Hendry and Santos (2005) to construct 
indices-of-indicator variables for each covariate.  
  To construct a country index for the intercept we estimate two probit models, one 
incorporating “new” EU countries’ dummies and one for “old” EU countries’ dummies. That 
is, one probit regression of ratings on the 12 “new” EU countries’ (intercept) dummy 










mi m i D Y δ    (3) 
 
where,  mi D  takes the value of one for a bank in country m and is zero otherwise and 
m δ ˆ denotes the respective estimated coefficients.  
                                                 
8 For example, if a bank’s rating was decided in January 2007 then the value of any explanatory factor measured 
over the whole of 2007 would be unknown when the rating was made.  
9 Not only are the financial covariates predetermined, the other covariates are also exogenous: the time variable 
is deterministic and the country index (discussed below) is constructed as a linear combination of deterministic 
country dummy variables (which are also deterministic). The use of lagged variables to avoid endogeneity is a 
strength of our work relative to some other authors who have used contemporaneous financial covariates when 
modelling ratings.  
10 The twelve “new” EU countries in our sample (associated with the fifth enlargement of the EU) are: Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
The fifteen “old” EU countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
11 There are 7 financial variables.  
12 Including all 27 countries’ dummy variables in one regression was not possible due to problems with 
estimating the model, hence the use of two separate regressions for “new” and “old” EU countries’ dummy 
variables. Note that both regressions use all 1168 observations. 6 
 
  The initial index for “new” EU countries is constructed as the sum of the products of the 
coefficients and their corresponding dummy variables for the statistically significant terms, 
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  Similarly, the following ordered-choice model is fitted to the 15 “old” EU country 
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  To obtain a preliminary index for all countries, ratings are then regressed on these two 
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i I I I γ γ ˆ ˆ + =    (8) 
  
  This index was checked for appropriateness by running a single regression that included 




i i D I Y α λ ˆ ˆ ˆ* + =    (9) 
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  If the latter individual dummy variable was significant the value of its coefficient,  m α ˆ , 
was incorporated into the country index. This was repeated for all 27 countries, that is, 27 
regressions containing only two variables (the country index and a particular country’s 
dummy) were estimated. After all the coefficients of the individual country dummies that 
were significant in these 27 regressions had been incorporated into the index this step was 
repeated until no individual country dummies were significant at the 5% level (when included 
in a regression with the country index). The result is the intercept country index – reported in 
Table 4.
13   
  A modified procedure was employed to construct indices for the non-intercept 
covariates. For each covariate (except for  i Date ) and slope interaction variables, 
C
pmi Z , for 




pmi D Z Z × =   (10) 
 
  For the p
th financial covariate, one regression is estimated using the “new” EU countries’ 
slope interaction variables. That is, ratings is regressed on the 7 financial variables, date and 

















pi p i i Z Z Date Y θ φ β    (11) 
 
  A corresponding regression for the p
th financial variable is estimated using slope 















pi p i i Z Z Date Y θ φ β    (12) 
 
  Initial indices for the p
th covariate for “new” and “old” EU countries, respectively, are 
constructed using only the statistically significant interaction terms in each regression 
(equations (11) and (12)), as: 
                                                 
13 Using an index of indicators to model country-specific factors in our model of ratings ensures that these 
country factors do not enter the disturbance term of this model. To the extent that there is some correlation 
between these country-specific terms and the financial covariates the inclusion of this country indicator in the 
model prevents endogeneity that could otherwise arise from this source.  
14 We do not include interaction terms for all 27 countries in one regression due to problems with estimating the 
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  To obtain a preliminary index of the p
th covariate for all countries we regress ratings on 





pi N i I I Y ω ω ˆ ˆ ˆ* + =    (15) 
 
 The  initial  country  slope index for the p







pi I I I ω ω ˆ ˆ + =    (16) 
  
  This index was refined by the following iterative process. A single regression that 
included the date, the financial variables, the initial country slope index plus a single 
interaction term for country m and the p
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  If the latter individual interaction term was significant the value of its coefficient,  pm μ ˆ , 
was incorporated into the country index. This was repeated for all 27 countries. After all the 
coefficients of the individual country interaction terms that were significant in these 27 
regressions had been incorporated into the index this iteration was complete. Further 
iterations were repeated until there was convergence giving the final country slope index for 
the p
th financial variable, 
CF
pi I . Complete convergence would be achieved when no  pmi Z  term 
was significant at the 5% level for any country in (17) in a full iteration. Convergence may 
also be achieved even if interaction variables can be added with significance between 9 
 
iterations if the change in the index is small between iterations (to some tolerance level).
15 
We found that 999 iterations was sufficient for all but the liquidity index to achieve complete 
convergence or make the changes between the values in the indices sufficiently small to 
conclude that they had converged.
16  For the liquidity index there is non-convergence such 
that the index is not the same between adjacent iterations but is exactly the same for every 
other iteration. In this case we tried both possible indices for liquidity in our regressions.
17  
  
3. Empirical Results 
 
  In this section we discuss two broad sets of results for the determinants of bank ratings. 
The first set allows heterogeneity to the extent that intercept and slope coefficients are 
different for “old” and “new” EU countries by employing shift dummy variables. The second 
set of results allows intercepts and slopes to be different for all countries (using index of 
indicator variables). For both sets we report a general model and one favoured parsimonious 
specification obtained using a cross-sectional variant of the general-to-specific 
methodology.
18 When there was ambiguity over which model to favour we selected the 
model with the lowest SBC. In all cases the favoured parsimonious models only include 
variables that are individually significant according to z-statistics and jointly significant 
according to a likelihood ratio test, denoted LR statistic. The restrictions placed on the 
general model to obtain the parsimonious model cannot be rejected according to a likelihood 
                                                 
15 We regard convergence to be achieved if the percentage change in the maximised value of the likelihood 
function does not exceed 0.01% between two adjacent iterations.  
16 The indices for assets, operating expenses to operating income and other operating income to assets converge 
completely by the 999
th iteration. The indices for equity, net interest margin and return on assets almost 
completely converge by the 999
th iteration in the sense that the index changes by a very small amount. The 
percentage changes in the maximised value of the log-likelihood function between the 998
th and 999
th iteration 
are 0%, 0.00006% and 0.00006% for these three variables, respectively, which is well below the tolerance level 
of 0.01% that we set. 
17 For the liquidity index the value of the index was exactly the same between adjacent iterations for all 
countries except for Luxembourg. For this country, the value of the index was 2.589 in the first iteration, –1.046 
in the second iteration, 2.589 in the third iteration, –1.046 in the fourth iteration and so on. We used the index 
that produced the best fit in our experiments, using the 998
th iteration (where the value for Luxembourg is –
1.046). Plots of the 998
th and 999
th iterations of the index for each of the 7 financial variables are available from 
the authors upon request.  
18 In this method we first delete all variables with z-statistics below one (or, exceptionally, 0.5 if the z-statistics 
are very small for a large number of variables) and apply a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test relative to the general 
model. If the restrictions cannot be rejected, we delete all variables with z-statistics below 1.5 and then all 
explanatory factors with z-statistics below 1.96 (applying all LR tests relative to the general model). If any LR 
test for joint restrictions is rejected, we experiment to find the variable(s) that cause this rejection and retain it 
(them) in the model.  10 
 
ratio test [LR(general→favoured)]. The favoured parsimonious models will yield more 
efficient inference relative to the general model and so they are used for inference. 
The ordered probit regression results that potentially allow shifts between “old” and 
“new” EU countries are presented in Table 1. The model reported in the column headed “No 
shift” in Table 1 contains no coefficients that shift for “new” EU countries (all the 
coefficients are the same for all countries). In the favoured model all the significant 
coefficients have plausible signs. That is, liquidity has a positive effect on ratings: banks with 
greater liquidity have a higher rating; the natural log of assets has a positive effect on ratings: 
banks with a larger size of assets have a higher rating; the net interest margin () NIM  has a 
positive correlation with ratings: a bank with a higher margin has a higher rating.
19 Further, 
operating expenses to operating income ( ) OI OE _  has a negative correlation with a bank’s 
rating: a bank with a greater ratio of operating expenses to operating income has a lower 
rating. All other variables are excluded from the favoured specification because they were 
insignificant in the general model. This benchmark model’s percentage of correct predictions 
is 33.6% which exceeds the predictive accuracy of 10% (given 10 rating categories) expected 
if the ratings were assigned randomly. Hence, the model adds predictive performance that is 
22.6 percentage points greater than that obtained by chance.  
  The favoured model in the column headed “Intercept shift” in Table 1 contains the 
intercept dummy variable that shifts for “new” EU countries, 
New
i D , but no slope coefficient 
shift variables. The same financial variables as for the “No shift” model are significant and 
have the same plausible coefficient signs, while the shift in the intercept is significant and 
negatively signed. The latter implies that, given the financial variables, “new” EU countries 
receive a systematically lower rating than “old” EU countries.
20 This may reflect, for 
example, higher country risk and/or regulatory and legal deficiencies in “new” EU countries 
and confirms our hypothesis that the country of origin is an important determinant of a bank’s 
rating. This model’s percentage of correct predictions is 37.4%, thus allowing the intercept to 
                                                 
19 A high NIM contributes to a bank’s profitability and enables them to build up sufficient reserves/provisions 
for potential losses. 
20 It should be emphasised that we cannot interpret the magnitude of the coefficient on the intercept shift term as 
indicating by how much, on average, ratings are lower (ceteris paribus) in “new” EU countries because the 
coefficients are not marginal effects.  11 
 
shift notably increases the model’s predictive performance relative to our benchmark 
model.
21  
  The favoured model in the column headed “All shift” of Table 1 contains variables that 
allow both the intercept and slope coefficients to shift depending upon whether the nation is 
an “old” EU or “new” EU country. Six “non-shift” variables are significant (equity, liquidity, 
ln(Assets), NIM, OE_OI and ROA) and their coefficients represent these variable’s 
associations with ratings for “old” EU countries. Seven of the “shift” variables are significant 
(intercept, equity, liquidity, ln(Assets), NIM, OOIA and ROA) which indicates that the 
influence of these variables on ratings is different for “new” EU countries and “old” EU 
countries.
22 The model’s percentage of correct predictions is 39.6% and demonstrates that 
allowing slopes to shift as well as the intercept further increases the model’s predictive 
performance.
23 The negative coefficient on the intercept shift term suggests that, as for the 
previous model, “new” EU countries have systematically lower ratings than “old” EU 
countries after the effects of financial variables have been taken into account. Further, the 
significance of the slope shift variables’ coefficients demonstrates that bank ratings responses 
to financial variables are different for “old” and “new” EU countries. This implies that RA’s 
determine ratings differently for “old” and “new” EU countries in terms of banks’ financial 
positions. 
  Table 2 reports the slope coefficients and t-ratios for “old” and “new” EU countries 
implied by the general and favoured specifications of the models reported in Table 1 under 
the heading “New EU intercept and slope shift”. From the results corresponding to the 
favoured specification, 5 of the 6 significant coefficients have the expected signs for the 
“old” EU countries. An increase in liquidity, assets, net interest margin and return on assets 
will have a positive impact on ratings whereas an increase in operating expenses relative to 
operating income has a negative effect on ratings. All of these relations are plausibly signed. 
However, the negative correlation of equity and ratings is unexpected. One possible 
rationalisation is that banks use equity to create a buffer against possible loss or non-
                                                 
21 The other reported measures of fit, pseudo 
2 R  and SBC, confirm this increase in fit and, being broader 
measures of fit, help guard against the result arising because the former measure focuses only on whether a 
model predicts with complete accuracy or not. 
22 The likelihood ratio statistics indicate that these shift variables are jointly significant, confirming that the 
coefficients for “old” and “new” EU countries are different for all of these variables. 
23 The other reported measures of fit, pseudo 
2 R  and SBC, confirm this increase in fit. 12 
 
performing assets.
24 Thus, a higher equity to assets ratio may indicate potential problems with 
asset quality, which is reflected in a lower rating.
25  
  For “new” EU countries 3 of the 4 significant coefficients of the favoured model reported 
in Table 2 have the expected signs. Increases in assets and operating income to assets have a 
positive impact on ratings whilst an increase in operating expenses relative to operating 
income has a negative effect on ratings. In contrast, the negative correlation of return on 
assets with a bank’s rating is not expected.
26 However, the coefficient is only just significant 
and may be due to a Type-I error (of which there is a 5% chance given our chosen 
significance level). Indeed, this finding of a positive coefficient on return on assets is not 
repeated in any other regressions and may, therefore, be regarded as a fragile result. 
  The results of the favoured model reported in Table 2 provide clear evidence that ratings 
are determined differently for “old” and “new” EU countries. The coefficient for “new” EU 
countries is significantly larger than for “old” EU countries for equity, assets and operating 
income. Conversely, the coefficient for “new” EU countries is significantly smaller than for 
“old” EU countries for liquidity, net interest margin and return on assets. Only for operating 
expenses to operating income are the coefficients the same for “old” and “new” EU countries. 
  Table 3 reports results where heterogeneous intercepts and slopes (for the financial 
covariates) are allowed for all countries and not just for the “new” and “old” EU country 
groupings. The models reported in the column headed “Intercept heterogeneity” contain the 
intercept country index but no country indices for the covariates’ slopes. From the favoured 
model that allows intercept heterogeneity only we see that all significant coefficients have 
expected signs except equity. Date, liquidity, assets, net interest margin and operating income 
have plausible positive effects on ratings while operating expenses has a plausible negative 
correlation with a bank’s rating. As before, equity has an unexpected negative impact on 
ratings suggesting that this may not be a fragile result.
27 It is particularly noteworthy that the 
intercept country index is highly significant and its inclusion in the model raises the model’s 
percentage of correct predictions substantially (compared with the models reported in Table 
                                                 
24 Until recently (before the crisis) equity (or capitalisation) was not a problem in banking. 
25 In transition economies it has been essential that banks build up high equity because of higher risk, although 
we do not find a negative correlation between ratings and equity for “new” EU countries.  
26 Return on assets is an indicator of profitability. In this specific case high profitability can be considered as a 
weakness that is associated with imprudent lending policies. In other words, a high  profit  may result from 
reckless lending. This would be especially relevant for “new” EU countries.  
27 A higher equity to assets ratio may be an indication of potential problems with asset quality which is reflected 
in a lower rating.  13 
 
1) to 48.0%.
28 This suggests that country-specific factors, beyond those captured by financial 
covariates, are very important determinants of ratings.  
  The models reported in the column headed “All heterogeneity” of Table 3 contain both 
heterogeneous intercept and slope indices. The same non-index covariates as reported in the 
favoured model under the “Intercept heterogeneity” column are significant, except for Date, 
and have the same coefficient signs. The index variables that are significant are for the 
intercept, liquidity and operating expenses: these are the only variables that exhibit 
significant coefficient heterogeneity. The percentage of correct predictions is 50.5%, which 
suggests that adding financial covariate indices (giving slope heterogeneity) raises the 
predictive performance by 2.5 percentage points relative to the model only allowing intercept 
heterogeneity.  
  The values of the intercept coefficients from the intercept country index are given in 
Table 4. All of the countries have different intercepts, indicating that all countries’ ratings 
contain a country-specific element. All of the “old” EU countries have larger intercepts than 
the “new” EU countries, indicating that country-specific factors lower “new” EU countries’ 
ratings relative to “old” EU nations, which confirms our initial hypothesis. However, it is 
worth emphasising that within “old” and “new” EU country groupings there is intercept 
heterogeneity. Hence, factors such as sovereign risk and country differences in the legal and 
regulatory frameworks in which banks specifically operate affect the ratings at the individual 
country level. Whilst we confirm that “new” EU countries have lower ratings than “old” EU 
countries (after controlling for financial variables) our results emphasise that ratings do not 
simply differ by “old” and “new” EU country cohorts. 
  The country-specific coefficients for the liquidity and operating expenses to operating 
income variables are reported in Table 5. All of the countries’ coefficients have the expected 
signs, except for Romania’s liquidity coefficient which is relatively small in magnitude, being 
virtually zero. With the exception of Romania (and Spain) “new” EU countries tend to have 
larger coefficients for both variables compared with “old” EU countries. Further, ratings tend 
to be more sensitive to liquidity for “new” EU countries relative to “old” EU countries, while 
ratings tend to be less responsive to the ratio of operating expenses to operating income for 
“new” EU countries compared with “old” EU countries. Whilst there is some heterogeneity 
for both variables, many coefficients are the same. That is, for 16 out of 27 countries the 
                                                 
28 This intercept index variable improves predictive performance relative to a model with no heterogeneity or 
shifts by 14.4 percentage points. That is, the model headed “Intercept heterogeneity” in Table 3 has a predictive 
performance of 48.0% compared with the model headed “No shift” in Table 1 where 33.6% of predictions are 
correct.  14 
 
coefficients are the same for liquidity and for 13 out of 27 countries they are the same for 
operating expenses. We note that only two financial variables show coefficient heterogeneity 
and within these variables many of the different countries’ parameters are the same, which 
contrasts with the intercept index which indicates a different value for all countries. It 
therefore appears that the main country heterogeneity comes from the intercept variable and 
only a small part comes from the different country responses of ratings to financial variables. 
  Further, recall that the predictive performance of the benchmark model containing no 
heterogeneous (or shifting) coefficients is 33.6%. Thus, the incorporation of a heterogeneous 
intercept increases this performance by 14.4 percentage points to 48.0%. Adding indices for 
both heterogeneous slopes and a heterogeneous intercept raises the model’s predictive 
accuracy to 50.5%, which is a relatively modest increase of 2.5 percentage points (compared 
with the model containing a heterogeneous intercept). This suggests that most of the 
improvement in fit comes from adding a heterogeneous intercept and only a small percentage 
from the addition of heterogeneous slopes. Thus, the heterogeneous intercept appears to be a 
crucial determinant of ratings and likely captures differences in factors such as sovereign risk 
and the legal and regulatory framework across all countries. The comparatively limited 
evidence in favour of slope heterogeneity is suggestive of only modest differences in the way 
banks are rated according to their financial positions across countries.  
  To provide a final assessment of our model we consider whether the favoured model that 
allows for intercept and slope heterogeneity (reported in the last column of Table 3) has 
constant parameters through time. Ten of the new EU countries joined in 2003 while two 
(Bulgaria and Romania) joined in January 2007 giving rise to the possibility of changes in the 
ratings assignment equations around these times. Further, the international banking crisis that 
began in the middle of 2007 (which the rating agencies reacted to by downgrading several 
banks) provides an additional reason for structural change after 2007. We therefore conduct 
likelihood ratio tests of parameter constancy [denoted LR(time shift)] using dummy variables 
to allow coefficient shifts in each of the years from 2003 to 2008 in Table 6. The column 
headed Intercept tests for a change in intercept only, the column headed Slopes tests for shifts 
only in the slope coefficients, while the column headed Slopes and Intercepts tests for 
structural change in both intercepts and slopes of the model. We also report the pseudo 
2 R , 
SBC and percentage of correct predictions of the unrestricted model (allowing for structural 
changes) used in the tests. 15 
 
  The LR tests indicate clear evidence of coefficient changes with 15 of the 18 tests 
rejecting parameter constancy at the 5% level.
29 To ascertain how much benefit modelling 
these coefficient shifts yield we consider the fit of the models allowing for time shifts relative 
to a baseline model that does not (the favoured model reported in the last column of Table 5). 
The pseudo 
2 R  is at least as large as the baseline model (0.259) for all 18 models that allow 
shifts with the largest being 0.277 for the model allowing shifts in both intercept and slopes 
in 2003. However, this measure would be expected to rise when the shift variables are added 
(even if they were not significant) and so this is not a particularly informative measure for 
this purpose. The SBC, which trades of fit against the number of coefficients in the model, 
may be more useful. Only 5 of the 18 models have a lower SBC than the baseline model 
(2.777) with the smallest (by far) SBC being 2.771 for the model with a shift in both intercept 
and slope in 2003. 
  The percentage of correct predictions is an especially useful measure in this context 
because it provides an interpretable comparison of the different models performance. 
According to this measure 4 of the 18 specifications that model parameter shifts through time 
have greater performance than that of the baseline model. The percentage of correct 
predictions rises from 50.514% for the baseline model to 50.599% for the models with just an 
intercept shift and with both an intercept and slope shift in 2008, and to 50.685% for the 
model with just an intercept shift in 2003 and the model with just a slope shift in 2008. The 
increase in predictive performance from modelling these time shifts is, at best, 0.171 
percentage points, which is a very modest rise. Hence, while the tests for parameter 
constancy through time suggest evidence for significant shifts, the benefit from modelling 
these changes through time is very small. We therefore believe that the inference from our 
baseline model is informative. To the extent that there are changes in the coefficients through 
time they most likely occur in 2003 which coincides with the accession of the first 10 of the 
“new” EU countries considered here and/or 2008, which is just after the accession of the last 






                                                 
29 The tests that could not reject parameter constancy were those that only allowed an intercept shift in the years 




  Our models of EU country ratings show that ratings are determined by financial variables 
and that these covariates have the expected coefficient signs except for equity. We suggest 
that the explanation for this latter result may be that a higher equity to assets ratio can be an 
indication of potential problems with asset quality which is reflected in a lower rating. 
Country-specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous intercepts) are a crucial determinant of 
ratings. Whilst “new” EU countries typically have lower ratings than “old” EU countries, 
after controlling for financial variables, it should be emphasised that all countries have 
significantly different intercepts. This intercept heterogeneity confirms our initial hypothesis 
that country-specific factors, beyond those captured by banks’ financial positions, influence 
ratings and may reflect differences in country risk and the legal and regulatory framework 
that banks face (such as foreclosure laws).  
  There may be some differences across countries in the assignment of ratings due to the 
liquidity and operating expenses to operating income variables. There is some evidence that 
ratings are typically more responsive to liquidity and less sensitive to operating expenses for 
“new” EU countries compared with “old” EU countries, although differences in assigning 
ratings according to financial variables across countries are relatively modest. However, it is 
clear that the primary country heterogeneity in ratings arises from the intercept rather than 
from the slopes. Nevertheless, construction of slope heterogeneity indices is a novel 
development in the methodology of producing index-of-indicator variables.  
  Whilst there is evidence that parameters may not be constant through time there is little 
benefit to modelling these coefficient changes in terms of the improved predictive 
performance. The shifts in coefficients most likely take place in 2003, which coincides with 
the accession of 10 of the “new” EU countries, and/or 2008 which is just after the accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU and when the emergence of the international banking 
crisis became apparent. The latter may reflect ratings agencies’ reaction to the discovery of 
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Table 1: Bank ratings probit regressions with new EU coefficient shift  
 
  No shift  New EU intercept 
shift 
New EU intercept 
and slope shift 
Variables  
(expected sign) 
Gen Fav Gen Fav Gen Fav 


















































































































Fit Measures         
% correct  33.390  33.647 37.158 37.414 39.555 39.555 
Pseudo 
2 R    0.096  0.095 0.142 0.140 0.160 0.159 
SBC  3.354  3.334 3.197 3.179 3.176 3.161 


























Observations  1168 1168  1168  1168  1168  1168 
Table 1 notes. The dependent variable is a bank’s rating which has ten categories that correspond to the integer values in the range of 1 to 
10 and yields nine limit points,  9   ,..., 2   , 1    , = i i λ  (the intercept is not separately identified from the limit points). Z-statistics (in parentheses) 
are based upon Huber-White standard errors and the percentage of correct predictions (% correct) use the category with the highest 
probability to give the predicted rating. Also reported are the Pseudo 
2 R  and Schwartz’s information criterion, SBC. Likelihood ratio tests 
for the model’s explanatory power, LR Statistic, the deletion of variables from the general model to obtain the parsimonious model, 
LR(general→favoured) the deletion of slope shift variables, LR(slope shift), and the deletion of slope and intercept shift variables, 
LR(slope/intercept shift) from a model are additionally reported. Probability values are given in square parentheses. All regressions were 
estimated using E-Views 6.0. 
 20 
 
Table 2: Implied slope coefficients and t-ratios of EU shift models  
 
  General Favoured 
Variables (expected sign)  Old EU  New EU  Old EU  New EU 
Date  0.018 
(1.509) 
   









































































Table 2 notes. The (implied) coefficients and t-ratios are reported for new EU and old EU countries based upon 
the general and favoured regressions reported in Table 1 under the column headed “New EU intercept and slope 
shift”. The coefficients and t-ratios for the old EU countries are exactly the same as those reported in Table 1. 
The coefficients for new EU countries are the sum of the coefficients on the variable of interest and its 
corresponding shift term. The t-ratios for new EU countries are calculated based upon the variance of the sum of 
a particular variable’s coefficient (a) and its corresponding shift variable’s coefficient (b), that is, Var(a + b) = 
Var(a)  + Var(b) + 2Cov(ab). An asterix indicates that a variable is significant at the 5% level (using a critical 
value of 1.96 in absolute value). 21 
 
Table 3: Bank ratings probit regressions with country heterogeneity 
 
  Intercept heterogeneity  Intercept and slope 
heterogeneity 
Variables  (expected  sign) Gen Fav Gen Fav 




































































1 _ − t Country Equity      0.00004 
(1.570) 
 




() 1 _ ln − t Country Assets      2.166 
(1.294) 
 
1 _ − t Country NIM      –0.00003 
(–1.088) 
 




1 _ − t Country OOIA      –0.0001 
(–0.201) 
 
1 _ − t Country ROA      –0.000001 
(–0.768) 
 
Fit Measures      
%  correct  48.116 48.031 50.086 50.514 
Pseudo 
2 R    0.248 0.248 0.261 0.259 
SBC 2.815  2.810  2.812  2.777 




















Observations 1168  1168  1168  1168 
Table 3 notes. The dependent variable is a bank’s rating which has ten categories that correspond to the integer values in the range of 1 to 
10 and yields nine limit points,  9   ,..., 2   , 1    , = i i λ  (the intercept is not separately identified from the limit points). Z-statistics (in parentheses) 
are based upon Huber-White standard errors and the percentage of correct predictions (% correct) use the category with the highest 
probability to give the predicted rating. Also reported are the Pseudo 
2 R  and Schwartz’s information criterion, SBC. Likelihood ratio tests 
for the model’s explanatory power, LR Statistic, the deletion of variables from the general model to obtain the parsimonious model, 
LR(general→*) the deletion of slope shift country variables, LR(slope heterogeneity), and the deletion of slope and intercept country 
variables, LR(slope/intercept heterogeneity) from a model are additionally reported. Probability values are given in square parentheses. The 
variables corresponding to the country shift are all determined after 999 iterations except the one for liquidity, which alternated between two 
different forms - we used the form corresponding to the 998




Table 4: Heterogeneous intercept (country weights) 
 
Country Weight  Country Weight 
Old EU  New EU 
Luxembourg 3.493 Estonia  0.653
Netherlands 2.527 Slovakia  0.590
UK 2.485 Malta  0.570
Denmark 2.450 Hungary 0.344
Spain 2.357 Cyprus  0.338
Sweden 2.137 Slovenia  0.284
Ireland 2.098 Czech  R  -0.172
Portugal 1.851 Poland -0.196
Finland 1.723 Bulgaria  -0.204
Belgium 1.559 Romania  -0.211
Austria 1.440 Lithuania  -0.227




Table 4 notes. The coefficient of the individual countries embodied in the index of indicators 
variable,  Country Intercept _ , are given. The coefficients are ranked from highest to lowest 
value.  23 
 
Table 5: Heterogeneous slopes 
 
Liquidity    Oe_oi 
Malta 0.900   Sweden  -1.696 
Lithuania 0.836   Denmark -1.695 
Latvia 0.802   Finland  -1.647 
Bulgaria 0.676   Romania  -1.642 
Slovenia 0.620   Germany  -1.601 
Spain  0.533  Austria  -1.591 
Austria     France  -1.587 
Belgium     Italy  -1.577 
Cyprus     Belgium 
Czech Republic     Cyprus 
Estonia     Czech Republic 
Finland     Estonia 
France     Greece 
Greece     Ireland 
Hungary     Luxembourg 
Ireland     Netherlands 
Italy     Poland 
Netherlands     Portugal 
Poland     Slovakia 
Portugal     Spain 











 Slovenia  -1.283 
Sweden 0.276   Bulgaria  -1.215 
Denmark 0.198   Lithuania -1.194 
Germany 0.132   Malta  -1.191 
Luxembourg 0.114   Hungary  -1.184 
Romania  -0.057  Latvia  -1.170 
Table 5 notes. The coefficients for each individual country implied by the financial 
variables’ parameters and the index of indicator variables,  1 _ − t Country Liquidity  and 




p β ˆ , and the product of the p
th variable’s index, 
CF
pi I , and its associated coefficient, 
CF






p I β β ˆ ˆ + . The coefficients are ranked from the highest to lowest value 
for liquidity and lowest to highest for operating expenses to operating income.  
 24 
 
Table 6: Tests for parameter constancy through time 
 
Year  Statistic  Intercept  Slope  Intercept and slopes 
Pseudo R
2 0.261  0.267 0.277 
SBC 2.774  2.800  2.771 
% Correct  50.685  49.829  49.572  2003 







2 0.261  0.266 0.276 
SBC 2.775  2.806  2.774 
% Correct  49.829  49.572  49.229  2004 







2 0.259  0.264 0.273 
SBC 2.781  2.812  2.786 
% Correct  49.572  48.973  49.829  2005 







2 0.259  0.263 0.273 
SBC 2.782  2.815  2.786 
% Correct  50.086  49.229  49.829  2006 







2 0.259  0.263 0.269 
SBC 2.782  2.816  2.800 
% Correct  50.171  49.914  50.257  2007 







2 0.260  0.263 0.266 
SBC 2.776  2.815  2.811 
% Correct  50.599  50.685  50.599  2008 






Table 6 notes: statistics assessing the constancy of coefficients in the favoured specification 
that allows both intercept and slope heterogeneity (reported in the final column of Table 3) 
are given. A dummy variable that takes the value of unity in the date specified in the column 
headed Year (as well as all subsequent periods) and is zero otherwise is added to this model 
and various statistics relating to this dummy-augmented specification are reported in the 
column headed Intercept. The same statistics for the favoured model under current 
consideration augmented by slope-shift terms (the time dummy is interacted with each 
explanatory variable in the model) are reported in the column headed Slopes. Similarly, 
statistics are also reported for the favoured model augmented by both a time-intercept shift 
dummy as well as slope-shift terms in the column headed Intercept and slopes. The reported 
statistics are the pseudo 
2 R , SBC and percentage of correct predictions (% correct) as well as 
a likelihood ratio test [denoted LR (time shift)] for the deletion of all time-dummy variables 
from the time augmented models. The probability values for this likelihood ratio test are 
given in squared parentheses.  
 
 CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3009 Yin-Wong Cheung, Guonan Ma and Robert N. McCauley, Renminbising China’s 
Foreign Assets, April 2010 
 
3010 Michel Beine and Sara Salomone, Migration and Networks: Does Education Matter 
more than Gender?, April 2010 
 
3011 Friedrich Schneider, Tilman Brück and Daniel Meierrieks, The Economics of Terrorism 
and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part I), April 2010 
 
3012 Friedrich Schneider, Tilman Brück and Daniel Meierrieks, The Economics of Terrorism 
and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II), April 2010 
 
3013 Frederick van der Ploeg and Steven Poelhekke, The Pungent Smell of “Red Herrings”: 
Subsoil Assets, Rents, Volatility and the Resource Curse, April 2010 
 
3014 Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstra and Frans van Winden, Identification of Voters with 
Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger, April 2010 
 
3015 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Davide Ciferri and Alessandro Girardi, Time-Varying Spot 
and Futures Oil Price Dynamics, April 2010 
 
3016 Scott Alan Carson, Racial Differences in Body-Mass Indices for Men Imprisoned in 19
th 
Century US Prisons: A Multinomial Approach, April 2010 
 
3017 Alessandro Fedele, Paolo M. Panteghini and Sergio Vergalli, Optimal Investment and 
Financial Strategies under Tax Rate Uncertainty, April 2010 
 
3018 Laurence Jacquet, Take it or Leave it: Take-up, Optimal Transfer Programs, and 
Monitoring, April 2010 
 
3019 Wilhelm Kohler and Jens Wrona, Offshoring Tasks, yet Creating Jobs?, April 2010 
 
3020 Paul De Grauwe, Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Macroeconomics, April 2010 
 
3021 Karl Ove Aarbu, Demand Patterns for Treatment Insurance in Norway, April 2010 
 
3022 Toke S. Aidt and Jayasri Dutta, Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability, April 
2010 
 
3023 Bahram Pesaran and M. Hashem Pesaran, Conditional Volatility and Correlations of 
Weekly Returns and the VaR Analysis of 2008 Stock Market Crash, April 2010 
 
3024 Stefan Buehler and Dennis L. Gärtner, Making Sense of Non-Binding Retail-Price 
Recommendations, April 2010 
  
3025 Leonid V. Azarnert, Immigration, Fertility, and Human Capital: A Model of Economic 
Decline of the West, April 2010 
 
3026 Christian Bayer and Klaus Wälde, Matching and Saving in Continuous Time: Theory 
and 3026-A Matching and Saving in Continuous Time: Proofs, April 2010 
 
3027 Coen N. Teulings and Nick Zubanov, Is Economic Recovery a Myth? Robust 
Estimation of Impulse Responses, April 2010 
 
3028 Clara Graziano and Annalisa Luporini, Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder 
has Multiple Tasks, April 2010 
 
3029 Erik Snowberg and Justin Wolfers, Explaining the Favorite-Longshot Bias: Is it Risk-
Love or Misperceptions?, April 2010 
 
3030 Doina Radulescu, The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare, 
April 2010 
 
3031 Helmut Lütkepohl, Forecasting Nonlinear Aggregates and Aggregates with Time-
varying Weights, April 2010 
 
3032 Silvia Rocha-Akis and Ronnie Schöb, Welfare Policy in the Presence of Unionised 
Labour and Internationally Mobile Firms, April 2010 
 
3033 Steven Brakman, Robert Inklaar and Charles van Marrewijk, Structural Change in 
OECD Comparative Advantage, April 2010 
 
3034 Dirk Schindler and Guttorm Schjelderup, Multinationals, Minority Ownership and Tax-
Efficient Financing Structures, April 2010 
 
3035 Christian Lessmann and Gunther Markwardt, Decentralization and Foreign Aid 
Effectiveness: Do Aid Modality and Federal Design Matter in Poverty Alleviation?, 
April 2010 
 
3036 Eva Deuchert and Conny Wunsch, Evaluating Nationwide Health Interventions when 
Standard Before-After Doesn’t Work: Malawi’s ITN Distribution Program, April 2010 
 
3037 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann, The Economics of International Differences 
in Educational Achievement, April 2010 
 
3038 Frederick van der Ploeg, Aggressive Oil Extraction and Precautionary Saving: Coping 
with Volatility, April 2010 
 
3039 Ainura Uzagalieva, Evžen Kočenda and Antonio Menezes, Technological Imitation and 
Innovation in New European Union Markets, April 2010 
 
3040 Nicolas Sauter, Jan Walliser and Joachim Winter, Tax Incentives, Bequest Motives, and 
the Demand for Life Insurance: Evidence from two Natural Experiments in Germany, 
April 2010 
  
3041 Matthias Wrede, Multinational Capital Structure and Tax Competition, April 2010 
 
3042 Burkhard Heer and Alfred Maussner, A Note on the Computation of the Equity 
Premium and the Market Value of Firm Equity, April 2010 
 
3043 Kristiina Huttunen, Jukka Pirttilä and Roope Uusitalo, The Employment Effects of 
Low-Wage Subsidies, May 2010 
 
3044 Matthias Kalkuhl and Ottmar Edenhofer, Prices vs. Quantities and the Intertemporal 
Dynamics of the Climate Rent, May 2010 
 
3045 Bruno S. Frey and Lasse Steiner, Pay as you Go: A New Proposal for Museum Pricing, 
May 2010 
 
3046 Henning Bohn and Charles Stuart, Population under a Cap on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, May 2010 
 
3047 Balázs Égert and Rafal Kierzenkowski, Exports and Property Prices in France: Are they 
Connected?, May 2010 
 
3048 Thomas Eichner and Thorsten Upmann, Tax-Competition with Involuntary 
Unemployment, May 2010 
 
3049 Taiji Furusawa, Kazumi Hori and Ian Wooton, A Race beyond the Bottom: The Nature 
of Bidding for a Firm, May 2010 
 
3050 Xavier Vives, Competition and Stability in Banking, May 2010 
 
3051 Thomas Aronsson and Erkki Koskela, Redistributive Income Taxation under 
Outsourcing and Foreign Direct Investment, May 2010 
 
3052 Michael Melvin and Duncan Shand, Active Currency Investing and Performance 
Benchmarks, May 2010 
 
3053 Sören Blomquist and Laurent Simula, Marginal Deadweight Loss when the Income Tax 
is Nonlinear, May 2010 
 
3054 Lukas Menkhoff, Carol L. Osler and Maik Schmeling, Limit-Order Submission 
Strategies under Asymmetric Information, May 2010 
 
3055 M. Hashem Pesaran and Alexander Chudik, Econometric Analysis of High Dimensional 
VARs Featuring a Dominant Unit, May 2010 
 
3056 Rabah Arezki and Frederick van der Ploeg, Do Natural Resources Depress Income Per 
Capita?, May 2010 
 
3057 Joseph Plasmans and Ruslan Lukach, The Patterns of Inter-firm and Inter-industry 
Knowledge Flows in the Netherlands, May 2010 
 
  
3058 Jenny E. Ligthart and Sebastian E. V. Werner, Has the Euro Affected the Choice of 
Invoicing Currency?, May 2010 
 
3059 Håkan Selin, Marginal Tax Rates and Tax-Favoured Pension Savings of the Self-
Employed – Evidence from Sweden, May 2010 
 
3060 Richard Cornes, Roger Hartley and Yuji Tamura, A New Approach to Solving 
Production-Appropriation Games with Many Heterogeneous Players, May 2010 
 
3061 Ronald MacDonald and Flávio Vieira, A Panel Data Investigation of Real Exchange 
Rate Misalignment and Growth, May 2010 
 
3062 Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig, Efficient Management of Insecure Fossil Fuel 
Imports through Taxing(!) Domestic Green Energy?, May 2010 
 
3063 Vít Bubák, Evžen Kočenda and Filip Žikeš, Volatility Transmission in Emerging 
European Foreign Exchange Markets, May 2010 
 
3064 Leonid V. Azarnert, Après nous le Déluge: Fertility and the Intensity of Struggle against 
Immigration, May 2010 
 
3065 William E. Becker, William H. Greene and John J. Siegfried, Do Undergraduate Majors 
or Ph.D. Students Affect Faculty Size?, May 2010 
 
3066 Johannes Becker, Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System, May 2010 
 
3067 Omer Biran and Françoise Forges, Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent 
Private Values, May 2010 
 
3068 Torben M. Andersen, Why do Scandinavians Work?, May 2010 
 
3069 Andrey Launov and Klaus Wälde, Estimating Incentive and Welfare Effects of Non-
Stationary Unemployment Benefits, May 2010 
 
3070 Simon Gächter, Benedikt Herrmann and Christian Thöni, Culture and Cooperation, June 
2010 
 
3071 Mehmet Bac and Eren Inci, The Old-Boy Network and the Quality of Entrepreneurs, 
June 2010 
 
3072 Krisztina Molnár and Sergio Santoro, Optimal Monetary Policy when Agents are 
Learning, June 2010 
 
3073 Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini, Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors: An 
Exploratory Analysis, June 2010 
 
3074 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Roman Matousek and Chris Stewart, EU Banks Rating 
Assignments: Is there Heterogeneity between New and Old Member Countries? June 
2010 